• A Rejoinder: An Admonishment of Traditional Religious Sciences

    An Admonishment to the Muslim Activist[1] is both penetrative and thought-provoking. As such, it elicits a response with the sole objective of generating a fruitful dialogue about Islamic activism in the modern world. In what follows, I will suggest an alternative reading and probe some of the articles contentions. From the onset, I cannot but agree with the articles primary diagnosis: the devolution of Islamic activism is largely the product of a disconnect between activism as praxis and Islam as theoria. To reclaim Islamic activism’s emancipatory potential, it must be resituated within the Islamic tradition.

    Firstly, Islamic activism is not lacking in religious knowledge. The pioneers of contemporary Islamic activism have emerged from traditional spaces such as Abul ‘Ala al-Mawdudi, Ahmad Sirhindi (, Shah Waliullah, Abul Hassan Ali an-Nadawi, Safar al-Hawali, Taqi ad-Din an-Nabahani, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad al-Ghazali and others. For these scholarly figures, a move towards activism represented not a ‘break’ with religious knowledge but its continuity by other means.  In short, we should not see ‘religious knowledge’ and ‘activism’ as being two-mutually exclusive spaces but rather two spaces which have become inadvertently and to our detriment separate.

    I would suggest that perhaps the lack of religious knowledge among the rank-and-file activists is in reality is part-and-parcel of a long-standing chasm that has grown between the spaces which produced Islamic sciences and the tumultuous political space[2]. It is not so much that activists have willingly or unwillingly failed to engage with traditional Islamic knowledge. A critical reading of Islamic intellectual history demonstrates how a confluence of factors lead to the transformation of the Islamic worldview from a praxis and lived movement to one beset by static sciences that at times became spaces for divisiveness and polemical fissures within the Muslim community.

    Secondly, for these activists, including the likes of Sayyid Qutb, Islamic activism was not only bound by Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) but activism – as a project and praxis – emanated from the tawhidic worldview. That is to say, activism was the emancipatory praxis manifest of la ilaha ila Allah. To resist, was to manifest the tawhidic negation (la ilaha) of all temporal hierarchies which subverted man to the worship of “Second Creators” and the pursuit of an Islamic State was a manifest of the tawhidic affirmation (ila Allah) through which the Sovereignty of the Creator was established. If the religious knowledges sought to establish the epistemic primacy of revelation, activism served as the medium through which that epistemic primacy became a totalizing sovereignty; epistemic and political primacy Thus, Islamic activism revived the very praxis of our worldview. It came to revive the single most important dimension of the Sunnah.

    Thirdly, anger, was not merely a reaction to colonial aggression but a rage against the hubris of a new modern god who rebelled against a cosmic order and in doing so disrupted that which is all so essential to humankind; meaning. Just as importantly, anger was not a reaction to temporal events, but a disposition rooted in a consciousness that understood the dictums of tawhid. It was only when Muslim subject understood the implications of the tawhidic worldview, did the Muslim subject become angry towards the modern world, and became an activist.

    Fourth, the article seems to suggest a series of generalizations which while applicable to modern variants of activism cannot be extended to all activists. If generalization is to serve as a starting point, one can extend the very same critique lodged by the author onto ‘modern’ religious knowledge space. No doubt, many activists have fallen prey to the mythos of the modern age. Religious spaces, similarly, have not been immune to the encroachments of the modern age. In even the most perceptibly authentic and traditional institutes, Islamic theology (‘ilm al-kalam, aqa’id), jurisprudence (fiqh) and legal theory (usul al-fiqh) are adopting revisionist discourses under the veneer of maqasid ash-Shari’ah and the principle of maslaha.

    If we are to suggest that activism can learn much from the traditional religious sciences, we must also come to terms with the ways in which the gatekeepers of religious knowledge can learn from activism.

    Wa Allaahu ‘Alaam

    [1] https://traversingtradition.wordpress.com/2018/03/26/an-admonishment-to-the-muslim-activist/

    [2] See Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment (Cambridge University Press, 2012)

  • The Illusion of Realism: What is the Future of Muslim Politics?

    The Illusion of Realism: What is the Future of Muslim Politics?

    In our so-called “post-ideological” world, even the most sincere observers have fallen trap to a myth perpetuated by the liberal order: that strategic political action or realpolitik transcends (or is devoid of) ideology. A case in point is the Tunisian Nahda movement’s decision to separate its political activities (primarily its political party) and its da’wah based activities. In 2016 the Nahda movement announced its shift from an “ideological movement engaged in the struggle for identity, to a protest movement against the authoritarian regime, and now to a national democratic party.”[1] This declaration came as no surprise given many of the movement’s earlier statements. During the opening of the party’s first congress since 2012, Rashid al-Ghannouchi emphasized, “We are keen to keep religion far from political struggles, and we call for complete neutrality.” This bifurcation, according to ideologues at an-Nahda, is grounded in the recognition that politics – as an activity – can and ought-to be divorced from normative and/or ideological commitments. Ghannouchi explains, “A modern state is not run through ideologies, big slogans and political wrangling, but rather through practical programmes.”[2] The intellectual backdrop of these statements traces back to the mid 1970’s, when Ghannouchi sought to develop an Islam of a “specific Tunisian character” and released his most famous book, Al-Hurriyat al-’Ammah fi’ Dawlah al-Islamiyyah (Public Liberties in the Islamic State), in which he makes the case for ‘Islamic democracy’ and ‘pluralism.’ The genealogy of al-Ghannouchi’s thought demonstrates a trajectory of accommodation, in which adjusting to new political realities takes precedence over Islamic ideological imperatives. In the end, al-Ghannouchi will come to dismiss the very idea of an Islamic State in ultimate reconciliation with the demands of ‘pragmatism.’

    In what follows, I shift the discussion from whether Islamists should engage in ‘realist’ politics to a more nuanced and revealing question: what constitutes ‘real’ or ‘realist’ political action in the first place? Furthermore, is the form of ‘pragmatic’ politics espoused by figures like Ghannouchi actually grounded in an ideologically neutral political space?

    Realism and Ideology

    For many, be it inside or outside the Muslim world, the very success of “political Islam” hinges on its capacity to forgo ‘ideology[3]’ and embrace objective politics. This myth, in turn, encourages “pragmatic” and/or “realist” politics. In his response to a question regarding the conditions for success in the Muslim world, the neoconservative Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation puts forth such an ultimatum:

    The test for some of these movements is what they value more: power or ideology. If it is power, they may compromise and liberalize in the democratic context or may try for a violent solution, such as a coup – and if they do, they are likely to fail. If ideology is more important, they will remain rigid and may decline like the Western European Communists did.[4]

    Cohen seemingly forgets the violent origins of the prevailing global order and its dogmatic ideology. For starters, the world-order is far from being ideologically “neutral” – quite the contrary – we live under the auspices of a neoliberal ideology which masquerades under the banners of reason, neutrality, human rights and sovereignty. But that much is now obvious. What is not as obvious is the fact that politics, be it domestic or international political action, cannot be de-linked from this ideology. Even prominent Realists Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, who pride themselves on their objectivity and neutrality, have come to concede that all foreign policy is, inevitably, the product of (1) a worldview, (2) principles, and (3) causal beliefs. They write, “at the most fundamental level, ideas define the universe of possibility.”[5]

    In order to better understand this point, let us say something about our present, i.e. the space in which we think and act and the “alternative futures” that such thinking and acting seeks to enact. The key here is to understand the ways in which the present-space into which we are conscripted shapes the cognitive-political background through which we, as Muslims, conceptualize our alternative future. As Oakeshott noted, “Both future and past…emerge only in a reading of present; a particular future or past is one eligible to be evoked from a particular present and is contingently related to the particular present from which it may be evoked.”[6] In other words, those objects of the future which we desire and the actions in which we partake to realize those desires are shaped by the ideology that shapes our present.

    These very same limited horizons and their concomitant shaping of what is ‘real’ and ‘possible’ are part and parcel of Muslim political consciousness today. Muslims find themselves between walls, in a world not of their own making, and a world that offers only a limited set of ‘real’ possibilities. David Scott echoes this in his critique of postcolonial intellectuals:

    I want to notice how the idea of alternative or subaltern modernities operate by constructing a normative expectation of resistance or overcoming. Notably, it does this, at least in part, by imagining the conditions of the modern as largely passive or negative environment merely waiting to be surmounted or mastered or translated or displaced by preconstituted subjects: modern transformations occur, and subaltern respond in more or less creative ways. Imagined in this way, what is obscured is the extent to which the transformed terrain on which these creative responses are being enacted is itself positively constituting (or rather, reconstituting) these subjects, there new objects of desire, and the new concepts that shape the horizon of that desire.[7]

    As such, the modern order not only instigates its own forms of counter-discourse but also furnishes us with the language (primarily modern categories) and realm of action for such resistance. More so, the modern order maintains its hegemony by arbitrating itself the right to determine what is real, or as a Hegelian dictum put it, “the real is rational.” And as such, “realism” in international politics comes to mean that which falls within the totalizing horizons of the modern project. The result is two-fold; the prevailing order is able to maintain its closure of the present – the finality of history, and the horizon of the colonized reaches only as far as the gaze of the master from whom recognition is sought. There is, in this narrative, no future, for the present becomes the horizon beyond which all is impossible if not unthought.

    As with any deity, the international order comes to define what is real. It conflates the “rules of the game” – the legal and structural stipulations of the international community – with the seemingly transhistorical laws of nations. And like any other false deity, it upholds for itself the ability to create the illusion of choice. The sovereign order, to use the words of Schmitt is characterized by its ability to both ordain such lies whilst suspending it.

    It follows that there are no purely “pragmatic” courses of action beyond “ideological” politics. If we can deduce anything from the political trends now emerging in the Muslim world, it is that those who uphold “pragmatic” politics have, far from abandoning ideological commitments, consciously or unconsciously internalized the ideological precepts of the prevailing world-order.

    Far from being a disavowal of politics altogether, the task at hand is to liberate politics from the straightjacket of the prevailing ‘order of things.’ It is helpful, in this regard, to recall Oliver Marchart’s distinction between le politique (political) and la politique (politics). Politics, in this sense is the “sedimented, institutionalized political,” whereas the political is “the pure disruptive/constitutive moment of the social” and the “founding or reconfiguring the relations of power as they reach closure in the form of society.”[8] In other words, the political creates a new ideological terrain; politics is the operationalization of that ideological terrain. The inauguration of the modern political order (and its concomitant disruption and reconfiguration of the Islamic polity and its social relations) constitutes our political moment, and has given rise to new forms of institutionalized politics.

    Contemporary Muslim politics – divorced from a radical commitment to a new political moment – has only served to sediment the prevailing world order’s closure of alternative possibilities. In contrast, a new political moment would disrupt this closure by generating a new mode of politics. Ghannouchi’s politics is then not merely neutral or strategic – as he would have it – but is in fact grounded in the colonial political moment and that moment’s own ideological commitments.

    The rise of a new Islamic politics hinges on the ability of Muslim movements to think beyond the sedimented and institutionalized political order. It will require the audacity to imagine a new political horizon and demand the impossible.

    Ali S. Harfouch is a Beirut-based Muslim activist and speaker on Islamic political thought. He received his M.A. in Political Studies from the American University of Beirut.

    Notes

    [1] Amara, Tarek. “Tunisian Islamists Ennahda move to separate politics, religion.” Al Jazeera. 20 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-politics-idUSKCN0YB2NO

    [2] Rifai, Ryan. “Tunisia’s Ennahda distances itself from political Islam.” Al Jazeera. 21 May 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/tunisia-ennahda-distances-political-islam-160520172957296.html

    [3] The author uses the term ‘ ideology’ differently from the Marxian concept of ideology.

    [4] Khan, MA Muqtedar. Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West.

    [5] Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change.

    [6] Scott, David. Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. 40.

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Yenigun, Halil Ibrahim. “The Political Ontology of Islamic Democracy: An Ontological Narrative of Contemporary Muslim Political Thought.”

  • Lecture by Ali Harfouch (speaker from MDI Lebanon) discussing the origins of Islamophobia in Europe, including the policies of Western governments and the historical context behind its interference in the Muslim world and is attempt to change the belief of Islam to suit its own worldview.

    Venue: School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)

  • It’s been four years since the start of the Syrian conflict, and the violence continues with no sign of abating. US-led air strikes pound the Syrian landscape and the humanitarian crisis has affected neighbouring countries.

    Joining John Rees to discuss the issue are Ali Harfouch, researcher at the Muslim Debate Initiative; and on the line Abdulaziz Almashi, co-founder of the Syria Solidarity Movement.